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ABSTRACT 
 
Yuqin Weng 
 
 In this thesis, two discrete-time control systems subject to noise, are modeled, 
analyzed and estimated. These systems are then subjected to attack by false signals such 
as constant and ramp signals. In order to find out how and when the control systems are 
being attacked by the false signals, several detection algorithms are applied to the 
systems. This work focuses on actuator attack detection. 
 To detect the presence of false actuator signals, a bank of Kalman filters is set up 
which uses adaptive estimation and conditional probability density functions for detecting 
the false signals. The individual Kalman filters are each tuned to satisfy a control system: 
one of which is the original system and the other of which is the system with a false 
signal. The use of the bank of Kalman filters to detect actuator attacks is tested in 4 cases; 
first-order system attacked by a constant or ramp signal and then a second-order system 
subject to the same types of attack signals. 
 This work shows the bank of Kalman filters can successfully detect the intrusion 
of false signals for actuator attack by using several different detection algorithms. 
Simulations show that the false signal is found and detected in all cases. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 General Background 
 
The motivation of this thesis work is to protect control systems from being 
attacked by false actuator signals. Actuators are components in a machine or a system 
that play a key role in moving a mechanism or controlling a system. An actuator usually 
needs a control signal and a power supply, so it can convert the control signal into a real 
action. Basically, an actuator acts as a bridge between the control system and the real 
world. Actuators are commonly used in everyday life, such as using a motor in an 
electro-pump system, starting an engine of a car and controlling a valve for a water 
system. 
 
There are several categories of actuators which can be roughly divided into three 
types from the perspective of how they are powered: by electric signal, hydraulic fluid or 
pneumatic pressure. These three diverse types of actuators are typically used in different 
situations as well; power grid systems use electricity to control the actuator, water 
treatment systems tend to have its actuator powered by fluid, while a turbine system may 
power the actuator by pressure.  
 
As mentioned, actuators are key components in control systems; a malicious 
attacker can modify transmission data sent between actuator components and disrupt the 
system's operations and cause irreversible damage to the control system and people who 
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depend on the control system [1]. As the security of such actuators in the control systems 
has been studied and researched for years, different bad results will show up when 
control systems such as oil refineries, water distribution networks, gas networks and 
power grid system are corrupted [2]. If any of these control systems is attacked, the 
consequences are unthinkable; thus, the safety of the control system is critically 
important. 
 
Let’s take a modern power system for an example; a false data injection attack on 
a power system would lead to both physical and economic impacts to the control system 
[3]. An example of economic attacks is, an attack on the electricity market to gain 
financial profit. A successful delayed attack resulting in line overloading undetected by 
the control center can lead to physical damage to the power system [3]. A damage of 
economic and physical attacks is not negligible for the control systems. In [4], the authors 
discuss how the attacks affect other parts of modern power system: state estimation, 
automatic generation control, energy market and voltage control. For state estimation, 
attackers can intelligently modify the sensor and actuator data at the meter level and then 
start an intrusion at the communication layer. In this case, it is very difficult for engineers 
to detect and protect the system quickly. Therefore, security detection for actuator and 
sensor intrusion is the first and most crucial step for protecting the control system.  
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1.2 Problem Statement   
 
Unauthorized access or hacking is an issue among either control systems or 
computer network systems. Malfunction caused by the introduction of false information 
sometimes can be fatal to control systems; such an invasion can easily go unnoticed. 
Estimation theory is used to analyze the systems for attack detection as well as 
protection. Analyzing the state and output of the control system is an effective way to 
detect false information or intrusions. When the state of the system is unknown, 
estimation techniques, such as Kalman filter or a bank of Kalman filters can be used to 
determine when and how the systems are corrupted, so that there may be enough time for 
engineers to protect and recover the systems once intrusion happens. Shutting down all 
the equipment immediately after the intrusion of false signals is one, and often the best, 
way to protect the control system. 
 
1.3 Review of Previous Work  
 
1.3.1 Review of Estimation Theory 
 
Estimation theory is a branch of statistics and signal processing that deals with 
estimating and observing the values of unknown parameters based on the measured 
empirical data [5] [6] [7]. Finding values for unknown data or states by using an 
estimator together with available measurements is commonly called the process of 
estimation. Three definitions are usually discussed in estimation theory: smoothing, 
filtering and prediction. Smoothing uses available measurement data to estimate 
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historical unknown parameters, filtering uses the measurements to estimate the present 
value of unknown parameters and prediction uses available measurement data to estimate 
the future value of unknown parameters [5]. 
 
There are a lot of fields in which estimation theory is used, for example, 
telecommunication, signal processing and adaptive control. There are also various 
estimators and estimation methods, such as Kalman filters, Extended Kalman filters, a 
Bank of Kalman filters, maximum likelihood estimators, Bayes Estimators, Wiener 
Filters, Maximum a posteriori (MAP)  Particle Filter and Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) [7]. Table 1.1 provides examples of estimation theory used in various fields. 
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Table 1.1: Applications of estimation theory [5][7]. 
 
Applications Examples 
Control Systems Estimation of the position of a cart in a cart-
pendulum system and stabilizing the system by 
using estimators. 
Sonar Estimation of the delay of the received signal 
from each sensor in the presence of noise  
Communications Estimation of the carrier frequency of a signal 
for demodulation to the baseband in the presence 
of degradation noise. 
Signal Processing Estimation of the parameters of the speech 
model in the presence of speech variability and 
environmental noise. 
Biomedical Estimation of the heart rate of a fetus in the 
presence of environmental noise. 
Image Processing Estimation of the position and orientation of an 
object from a camera image in the presence of 
lighting and background noise. 
Radar Communications Estimation of the delay in the received pulse 
echo in the presence of noise. 
Orbit determination Estimation of the trajectory of objects such as 
moons, planets and aircraft. 
 
As mentioned in the section above, this paper will mainly use a Kalman filter and 
a bank of Kalman filters designed for actuator intrusion detection. The filter and how to 
apply its algorithms to estimate states will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
1.3.2 Literature Review 
 
Actuator and sensor security is a widespread problem [2, 8, 9]. The authors in [8] 
focus on a decoding algorithm so that the states of the system can be recovered correctly; 
at the end of their paper, the performance of the decoder on numerical examples is 
demonstrated as well to show the states are recovered from the simulation. In [2], a 
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control gain 𝐾𝑐 is designed for state-feedback which can increase the resilience of the 
system when attacked. Then the authors try to find if there exists a control law that drives 
the state of the system to the origin even if some of the actuator and sensors are attacked, 
in other words, the authors attempt to stabilize the system despite attacks on some of the 
actuators and sensors. Simulations of the attack are shown at the end of the paper. A 
recent study shows that by using a proper control variable, the system can be recovered to 
the original state from attack [9]; in this paper, the authors have used different control 
variables and the control variables have different positive impact on the system which 
brings the system to the original state after attack. The authors also state that the control 
system could quickly go back to the normal operation mode if proper optimal control 
laws are applied.  
 
R.N. Clark was the first person to discuss a bank of Kalman filters used for 
instrument failure detection (IFD) in 1978 [10]. An example diagram of the system used 
in [10] is shown in Figure1.1. In the abstract of [10], Clark stated, “Observer designs, and 
detection logic are found for which 14 separate instrument faults are detected without 
false alarms. The scheme is shown to be robust with respect to variations in two 
significant physical parameters.”   
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Figure 1.1 Bank of Estimators [10] 
 
Clark used a Boat-Instrument-Autopilot Model to illustrate the idea. The logic for fault 
detection used the subtraction between the real output and estimated output compared 
with a threshold. The alarm sounds if the subtraction exceeds the threshold. In the 
conclusion section, Clark presented that the robustness of the attack detection can only 
tolerate with 10-percent variations in two important physical parameters [10]. However, 
Clark chose a system without random disturbance and the estimators used are Luenberger 
observers. Once noise was added to the system, the bank of Luenberger observers is 
replaced by a bank of Kalman filters since the Kalman filter does a better job dealing 
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with the random disturbance than a Luenberger observer.  Clark also had some later work 
involving bank of estimators using a bank of Kalman filters. 
 
In a recent study [11], the authors tried to apply a bank of Kalman filters for fault 
detection to a wind turbine generator system. Subtraction between the real output and 
estimated output are also used to decide if the system is attacked by the comparison to a 
threshold. At the end of the paper, the authors stated there are no miss detections in all 
their experiments.  
 
 Another paper addresses false data injection attacks (FDIAs) [12]. The authors of 
this paper use a tool, X2- detector, which is a proven-effective exploratory method used 
with Kalman Filter for detecting false signals. The authors applied this technique to 
detect attacks such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and then calculate the subtraction 
of the real and estimated output value in time and call it the residual matrix. After finding 
out the covariance matrix of the residual matrix; the authors compute the product of 
residual matrix and its covariance matrix and compare this result with a precomputed 
threshold to identify a failure or an attack [12]. However, the X2- detector does not 
perform well on detecting failure for the system attacked by FDIAs. Thus, the authors 
also analyzed the Euclidean distance method for detecting the failure in which the control 
system is attacked by FDIAs. Although this paper has only implemented the methods on 
sensors, X2- detector and Euclidean distance method can also be utilized for actuator 
failure detection.   
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In 2016, M. S. Ayas and S. M. Djouadi found interesting results for actuator 
attacks in cyber-physical systems [13]. M. S. Ayas and S. M. Djouadi have different 
experiments on both sensor and actuator attacks and they concluded that there will be 
some undetectable attack signals that compromise cyber-physical systems without being 
noticed by engineers. More importantly, system output responses obtained without attack 
are nearly the same for system output responses under undetectable attack. This proves 
that undetectable attack signals have successfully gone into the system without notice. In 
addition, the authors state that the actuator signal attack is optimal in the sense of 
minimal energy attack signal[13], which means the actuator attack is more likely to 
happen in a control system. 
 
References [14]-[18] use similar methods to calculate residuals of real and 
estimated output value for each state and compare the residuals to a threshold value to 
check if the system is corrupted like discussed before. The difference is that the authors 
used different systems to investigate the problem. For examples, [14] used a power grid 
system to investigate fault detection, [16] chose an electro-pump system and [17] 
implemented their method on a wastewater treatment process by using an extended 
Kalman filter.  
 
1.4  Summary of Main Contributions  
 
This thesis proposes to investigate actuator attacks in control systems. Several 
control systems are modeled, analyzed and subsequently attacked by false actuator 
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signals. There are two different cases, first and second order systems are both studied in 
this paper.  
 
To characterize the attack and detection process, the effect of different process 
and measurement noise covariances are investigated in the study. Lastly, a method to 
check the system state mean is also presented as an extension for actuator intrusion 
detection.  
 
1.5 Thesis Organization  
 
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 2 discusses a review of 
estimation theory and provide the Kalman filter equations, update algorithms as well as 
implementation and applications. A simple introduction to a bank of Kalman filters and 
Bayesian estimation theory is also included in this chapter. In Chapter 3, the concept of 
state feedback design is introduced and models for the first and second order systems are 
provided with plots that show the original state and output of the systems. The control 
inputs for these systems are replaced by an attack signal of either a constant or ramp 
signal. The states and output are again plotted to show how they are changed by the false 
control signals. Chapter 4 talks about the case study for both systems that are estimated 
by a bank of Kalman filters algorithm. Chapter 5 is a brief summary of this paper and 
discussions for future work. 
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2. ACTUATOR INTRUSION DETECTION USING ESTIMATION THEORY: 
A REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, estimation theory is a branch of statistics. Kalman filters 
and other estimators are commonly used in estimation theory. The Kalman Filter is 
named after R.E. Kalman.  In 1960, R.E. Kalman first used his filter to obtain reliable 
performance for the discrete time linear filtering problem [19]. The Kalman filter has 
now become one of the main estimation tools in statistics and estimation theory.  
 
The Kalman filter estimates the value of unknown states by using past 
measurement data. The Kalman filter can also be applied to estimate the outputs of 
systems [9]. Other estimators like the Luenberger observer, can be used to estimate states 
of systems as well; the Luenberger observer has an estimate of the state and output based 
on the given system and uses it to determine output error [20]. More studies of 
differences between Kalman filter and other observers can be found in [21], where the 
authors summarize the strengths and weaknesses of different estimators. 
 
2.2 Kalman Filter and Its Applications 
 
In this section, the Kalman filter equations and algorithm are presented. 
Furthermore, the applications of Kalman filter and its derivatives are listed in detail. 
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2.2.1  Kalman Filter Equation Derivation 
 
The Kalman filter equations are derived by starting with a simple stochastic 
discrete-time state space model: 
 
𝑥𝑘+1 =  𝐴𝑥𝑘 +  𝐵𝑢𝑘 +  𝐹𝑣𝑘 (2.1) 
  
 
𝑦𝑘 =  𝐶𝑥𝑘 +  𝐷𝑢𝑘 +  𝐺𝑤𝑘 (2.2) 
 
Eq. 2.1 is the state evolution equation and (2.2) is the measurement equation. In 
these equations, index 𝑘, is the sample and takes on value 0, 1, 2… ,  𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷, 𝐹, 𝐺 are 
time-invarient system matrices of appropriate dimenstions, 𝑥𝑘 ∈ 𝑅
𝑛 is the state vector, 
𝑢𝑘 ∈ 𝑅
𝑙 is the control input vector, 𝑣𝑘 ∈ 𝑅
𝑝 is the process noise vector,  𝑦𝑘 ∈ 𝑅
𝑚 is the 
output vector, and 𝑤𝑘 ∈ 𝑅
𝑞 is the process noise vector. The state has an initial value 
𝑥0. The covariance of the process noise 𝑣𝑘, is  𝑉, and the covariance of the measurement 
noise 𝑤𝑘, is 𝑊. The cross-covariance of 𝑣𝑘, and 𝑤𝑘, is 𝑆, leading to 
 
Covariance ([
𝑥0
𝑣𝑘
𝑤𝑘
]) =  [
𝑃0 0 0
0 𝑉 𝑆
0 𝑆𝑇 𝑊
] (2.3) 
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where 𝑃0, is the first term of the error covariance. The error covariance 𝑃𝑘, will be 
discussed later. If  𝑣𝑘, and 𝑤𝑘, are not correlated, the cross-covariance term 𝑆 will be the 
zero matrix.  
 
 The next step is to define an error term 𝑒𝑘+1, between the true state value 𝑥𝑘+1, 
and the estimated state value  ?̂?𝑘+1, 
 
 
𝑒𝑘+1 =  𝑥𝑘+1 −  ?̂?𝑘+1 (2.4) 
 
The goal of a Kalman filter is to minimize the error covariance  𝑃𝑘+1 , which is 
dependent on  
 
𝑃𝑘+1 = 𝐸{(𝑒𝑘+1)(𝑒𝑘+1)
𝑇} (2.5) 
       
At each time 𝑘, we will have the value of estimated state ?̂?𝑘, the value of system input 
𝑢𝑘, and the value of system output 𝑦𝑘, [9] [22]. By using these three values, the estimate 
is calculated by 
 
 
?̂?𝑘+1 =  𝐴?̂?𝑘 +  𝐵𝑢𝑘 +  𝐾𝑘(𝑦𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘) (2.6)  
 
14 
 
 
 
in which ?̂?𝑘, and 𝐾𝑘 represent the estimated system output and Kalman gain. The 
estimated, ?̂?𝑘, is given by 
 
?̂?𝑘 =  𝐶?̂?𝑘 +  𝐷𝑢𝑘 (2.7)  
   
To find the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘, the error covariance of the Kalman filter given by (2.5) 
needs to be found, 
 
The error at time (𝑘 + 1) needs to be calculated in order to calculate the error 
covariance term  𝑃𝑘+1. By substituting (2.1), (2.2), (2.6), (2.7) into (2.4), 𝑒𝑘+1, is given 
by (2.8), 
 
𝑒𝑘+1 = (𝐴 −  𝐾𝑘𝐶)𝑒𝑘 +  𝐹𝑣𝑘 −  𝐾𝑘𝐺𝑤𝑘 (2.8) 
  
   
Substituting (2.8) into (2.5) yields: 
 
𝑃𝑘+1 =  𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐴
𝑇 −  𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇𝐾𝑘
𝑇 −  𝐾𝑘𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐴
𝑇 +  𝐾𝑘𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇𝐾𝑘
𝑇 +  𝐹𝑉𝑘𝐹
𝑇
− 𝐾𝑘𝐺𝑆
𝑇𝐹𝑇 −  𝐹𝑆𝐺𝑇𝐾𝑘
𝑇 + 𝐾𝑘𝐺𝑊𝐺
𝑇𝐾𝑘
𝑇 (2.9)
 
 
Since the error covariance matrix 𝑃𝑘+1, is a symmetric matrix, one property of this matrix 
is that minimizing the error covariance matrix is equivalent to minimizing the trace of 
itself,  𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1} [9] [23]. By taking the partial derivative of of 𝑇𝑟{𝑃𝑘+1} with the respect 
to 𝐾𝑘, and setting it equal to zero, the equation for the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘, is obtained, 
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𝐾𝑘 = (𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇 +  𝐹𝑆𝐺𝑇)(𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇 +  𝐺𝑊𝑘𝐺
𝑇)−1 (2.10) 
 
Knowing the value of the Kalman gain 𝐾𝑘, at each time 𝑘, so the error covariance 
equation given in (2.9) can be simplified as 
 
𝑃𝑘+1 =  𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐴
𝑇  +  𝐹𝑉𝑘𝐹
𝑇 −  (𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇 +  𝐹𝑆𝐺𝑇)(𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇 +  𝐺𝑊𝑘𝐺
𝑇)−1 
(𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐴
𝑇 +  𝐺𝑆𝑇𝐹𝑇) (2.11) 
  
 As mentioned before, if the process noise 𝑣𝑘, and the measurement noise 𝑤𝑘, are not 
correlated, the cross-covariance term 𝑆, will be zero. Commonly in control systems 𝑣𝑘, 
and 𝑤𝑘, are zero mean. Thus, the Kalman gain and the error covariance can be further 
simplified, 
 
𝐾𝑘 = 𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇  (𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇 +  𝐺𝑊𝑘𝐺
𝑇)−1 (2.12) 
 
𝑃𝑘+1 =  𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐴
𝑇  +  𝐹𝑉𝑘𝐹
𝑇 −  𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇  (𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇 +  𝐺𝑊𝑘𝐺
𝑇)−1(𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐴
𝑇) (2.13) 
 
By substituting (2.7) into (2.6), the state update equation is given by (2.14),   
 
?̂?𝑘+1 =  𝐴?̂?𝑘 +  𝐵𝑢𝑘 +  𝐾𝑘(𝑦𝑘 − [𝐶?̂?𝑘 +  𝐷𝑢𝑘])  (2.14) 
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The reason why the state update equation is organized in this way is that (2.12), (2.13) 
and (2.14) represent a recursive process to update the state estimation based on the past 
measurement [9]. For each time, the error covariance is minimized by the Kalman gain so 
that the error between the true state value and the estimated state value will also be 
decreased. This is how the Kalman filter works for estimating state variables.  
 
2.2.2 Kalman Filter Update Algorithm 
 
 Updating a Kalman filter is a two-steps update process, a state prediction and a 
measurement update. The Kalman filter update process can be understood as a feedback 
control, the Kalman filter estimates the unknown state and then obtains feedback in the 
form of output measurements with some noise [24]. Thus, it is can be concluded that the 
state update step is to project the current state and error covariance to obtain a new 
estimate for the next time step, and the measurement update is to correct or update the 
new state using the new measured value by a weighted average [9] [24]. 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the update algorithm of the Kalman filter, the Kalman gain is 
calculated in ① at k = 0. With the measurement data and the Kalman gain, we can 
update the state estimate in ②. Then state estimate is used in ③ for updating the error 
covariance. Finally, the error covariance is used to calculate the Kalman gain again at the 
next time step k = 1. The process then continues. 
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①Calculate Kalman gain 
𝐾𝑘 = 𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇  (𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇
+  𝐺𝑊𝑘𝐺
𝑇)−1 
        Update state estimate 
?̂?𝑘+1 =  𝐴?̂?𝑘 +  𝐵𝑢𝑘 +  𝐾𝑘(𝑦𝑘
− [𝐶?̂?𝑘 +  𝐷𝑢𝑘]) 
③Update the error covariance 
𝑃𝑘+1 =  𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐴
𝑇  +  𝐹𝑉𝑘𝐹
𝑇
−  𝐴𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇 (𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐶
𝑇
+  𝐺𝑊𝑘𝐺
𝑇)−1(𝐶𝑃𝑘𝐴
𝑇) 
Measureme
nt data, 𝒚𝒌 
 
Initialize the state 
estimate and 
error covariance 
?̂?0，𝑃0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Figure of Kalman filter algorithm [9] [25]. 
 
 
 
 
② 
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2.2.3 Kalman Filter Applications 
 
As mentioned above, since R.E. Kalman developed the Kalman filter, the Kalman 
filter has been used in many different applications. As a minimum-variance estimation 
for dynamic systems, the Kalman filter has attracted much attention with the increasing 
demands of target tracking, navigating or imagine processing and so on. The Kalman 
filter has been used in various algorithms that were proposed for deriving optimal state 
estimation in the last thirty years [26]. Table 2.1 shows some of the typical applications 
of Kalman filter and its variations 
 
Table 2.1: Applications of Kalman filter and its variations. 
 
Applications Examples 
Control Systems Estimating the states of control systems. 
Tracking and navigation Filtering out the noise for better performance of 
tracking and navigation. 
Economics Parameter estimation of linear and non-linear 
econometric models [9]. 
Signal Processing The noise of the signal will be filtered, and the 
signal will be estimated as well. 
Image Processing The noise and disturbance in a photo is filtered 
out. 
Forecasting Estimating the parameters of the forecasting 
model using the measured data [9]. 
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2.3 Adaptive Estimation  
  
2.3.1  Introduction to Adaptive Estimation  
 
Adaptive estimation is used for estimating unknown parameters or unknown 
states. One way to do adaptive estimation is by using a set of Kalman filters and parallel 
processing technique. In this work, the concept of a bank of Kalman filters is used to 
estimate and detect the faults in control systems and estimate the system states. 
In 1974, researchers studied how parallel identification works, assuming the 
unknown parameters or state vector 𝑅, is discrete or quantized to a finite number of 
values {  𝑅1,  𝑅2, … ,  𝑅𝑖, … , 𝑅𝑛}, with known or assumed priori probability for each  𝑅𝑖 . 
The conditional estimator includes a bank of n Kalman filters where the 𝑖th Kalman filter 
is the posteriori probability of  𝑅𝑖 , which is updated recursively using the noisy signal 
measurements and the state of  𝑖th Kalman filter [22].  For this research work, assuming 
that attackers would compromise the input of the control system, the state vector 𝜃 
represented by control input 𝑈. Potential false information that attackers insert into the 
control system can be expressed as 𝑈1 , 𝑈2,…, 𝑈𝑖 , … , 𝑈𝑛, each of the inputs is used to 
design one of the Kalman filters in the bank. 
 
2.3.2 Bank of Kalman Filters Algorithm 
 
Figure 2.2 depicts the flow of data through a bank of Kalman filters to find an 
unknown parameter: a set of possible values or hypotheses for the unknown parameter is 
calculated as 𝑅 = {  𝑅1,  𝑅2, … ,  𝑅𝑖, … , 𝑅𝑛} in which  𝑅𝑖, is one of the hypotheses. A 
20 
 
 
 
Kalman filter is designed for each possible parameter value or hypothesis. The 
conditional probability of each one of the Kalman filters in the bank will be calculated 
according to the current measurements [27]. The filter that shows highest probability 
among all conditional probabilities identifies the most likely parameter value or 
hypothesis. 
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Not only can a bank of Kalman filters track the states and decide which parameter is the 
best to adopt for the system, it can also determine whether the control system has been 
Figure 2.2: Block diagram of adaptive estimation technique based on banks of 
Hypothesis1 
𝑅1 
. 
. 
. 
y 
Kalman 
Filters  
Conditional 
Probability 
Density 
Estimates 
Hypothesis 
Selection 𝑅 
Most Probable 
State Estimate 
 
Conditional 
State Estimates 
?̂?1  
?̂?2  
?̂?𝑁  Hypothesis N 
𝑅𝑁 
Hypothesis2 
𝑅2 
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compromised. In Figure 2.3, when measurements y𝑘, from a system that is not under 
attack goes into the Kalman filters in the bank, the probability of the state estimate being 
from the correct control signal is high. On the other hand, when the measurement y𝑘, 
from a system under attack goes through the filters and the decision block, the probability 
of state estimate being from the correct control signal drops to zero while the probability 
of the measurement is false goes high indicating the control system is being attacked. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3:Block diagram of adaptive estimation technique for determining the true 
control system. 
 
 
The conditional probability of each Kalman filter, is given in (2.15) [27]: 
 
𝑝(𝑅𝑖|𝑌𝑘)  =
𝑝(𝑌𝑘 ,   𝑅𝑖)
∑ 𝑝(𝑌𝑘|𝑅𝑚)𝑁𝑚=1 𝑝(𝑅𝑚)
(2.15)
Bank of 
Kalman Filters  
Kalman filter1 
𝑈𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 
y𝑘 
Decision 
block 
Kalman filter2 
𝑈𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 
?̂?𝑘
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 
?̂?𝑘
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 
  
𝑃𝑘 
 
𝑃𝑘 
 
𝑃𝑘
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 
𝑃𝑘
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑒 
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where  𝑝() represents a probability density function. Eq. 2.15 can also be expanded and 
to become (2.16) [27]: 
 
𝑝(𝑅𝑖|𝑌𝑘)  =
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝑅𝑖)𝑝(𝑅𝑖|𝑌𝑘−1)
∑ 𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝑅𝑚)𝑁𝑚=1 𝑝(𝑅𝑚|𝑌𝑘−1)
(2.16) 
 
In (2.16), 𝑌𝑘−1, denotes all the measurements in the sequence up to and including time, 
𝑘 − 1  and 𝑦𝑘, represents the measurement at each time 𝑘, finally 𝑅𝑖, means one of the 
possible values of the control inputs (the original and false signals) that will be used in 
the Kalman filters in the bank. Since there are only two situations in this work: the true 
and false control input, (2.16) can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑝(𝑅𝑖|𝑌𝑘)  =
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝑅𝑖)𝑝(𝑅𝑖|𝑌𝑘−1)
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1,𝑅1)𝑝(𝑅1|𝑌𝑘−1)+𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1,𝑅2)𝑝(𝑅2|𝑌𝑘−1)
(2.17) 
   
Convergence occurs when the posterior probability of the filter corresponding to the 
hypothesis closest to the current control input of the system approaches one.  
 
 To calculate  𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝑅𝑖)  , all the measurement and process noises are 
assumed to be Gaussian, which means they have Gaussian conditional probabilities. 
Thus,  𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝑅𝑖)  becomes (2.18) [27]: 
 
𝑝(𝑦𝑘|𝑌𝑘−1, 𝑅𝑖)  = (2𝜋)
−𝑛 2⁄ |Ω𝑘|𝑅𝑖
−1 |
1 2⁄
∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
1
2
?̃?𝑘|𝑅𝑖
𝑇 Ω𝑘|𝑅𝑖
−1 ?̃?𝑘|𝑅𝑖) (2.18) 
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Here 𝑛, represents the dimension of the control system, and ?̃?𝑘|𝑅𝑖, in (2.18) is called 
innovation sequence and is defined as:  
 
?̃?𝑘|𝑅𝑖 =  𝑦𝑘 − ?̂?𝑘|𝑘−1,𝑅𝑖 (2.19) 
   
The innovation covariance of the Kalman filter is Ω𝑘|𝑅𝑖, and is calculated by 
 
Ω𝑘|𝑅𝑖 =  𝐶𝑃𝑘|𝑅𝑖𝐶
𝑇 + 𝐺𝑊𝐺𝑇 (2.20) 
   
The conditional probability of the original and the attacked scenarios of the control 
system can be calculated according to the equations above. 
 
2.3.3 Bank of Kalman Filters Application 
 
A bank of Kalman filters is usually used in adaptive estimation and parallel 
identifications. Engineers use this technique to identify the authenticity of the parameters 
or if the control system is compromised. Table 2.2 shows several applications of a bank 
of Kalman filters. 
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Table 2.2: Applications of Bank of Kalman filters. 
 
Applications Examples 
Parameter Identification Testing several unknown parameters to have the 
closest one in a real system. 
Sensor Intrusion 
Detection 
Detecting control system is being compromised 
or not by testing control system states. 
Actuator Intrusion 
Detection 
Detecting control system is being compromised 
or not by testing control system inputs. 
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3. MODELS OF ACTUATOR ATTACKS IN CONTROL SYSTEM  
 
In this chapter, two discrete-time systems to be used for simulations are designed. 
In addition, two distinct types of false signals are created to act as actuator signals. The 
performance of each system being attacked by each false signal is shown. To build a 
discrete- time state space model with feedback and input for discussing actuator attack, a 
control input 𝑢𝑘, needs to be developed therefore, a control variable 𝐾𝑐  is to be 
calculated as well. It is common to refer the state-variable controller (full-state control 
law plus the observer) as a compensator [28], the concept of a compensator and how the 
control variable 𝐾𝑐 is found will be mentioned in the next section. 
 
3.1 Introduction to Actuator Attacks in Control System 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, the results of actuator attacks could be horrible, here is 
a block diagram of a feedback control system with actuator attacks:  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Block diagram of a general negative feedback control system with attack 
signals. 
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For this work, when designing a feedback control, the pole-placement technique may be 
used. Thus, controllability and observability of the control system must be verified before 
pole placement can be implemented [28]. After knowing the poles we want to place, the 
control gain 𝐾𝑐, can be calculated, so that, 𝑢𝑘 = −𝐾𝑐 𝑥𝑘. The goal of the attackers is to 
replace the control input 𝑢𝑘, with a false signal and then the control system is 
compromised by the false information.  
 
It is assumed that the state and the output of the control system are available in 
this chapter. Both the original and attacked state and output values are obtained by 
calculation. By considering the false signal ℎ𝑘 as a state as well when the system is 
attacked, the dimension of the discrete-time state space model of the attacked system is 
increased by adding one new state.  
 
As mentioned before, the control system needs to be completely controllable and 
observable. For a single-input and single-output system, the controllability of the system 
is described by a matrix 𝑃𝑐, (presented as the continuous-time form): 
 
𝑃𝑐 =  [𝐵  𝐴𝐵  𝐴
2  …  𝐴𝑛−1𝐵] (3.1) 
 
The system’s controllability relies on the determinant of 𝑃𝑐, being non-zero. The 
observability matrix, 𝑃𝑜, is given by (3.2): 
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𝑃𝑜 =  [
𝐶
𝐶𝐴
⋮
𝐶𝐴𝑛−1
] (3.2) 
 
The control system is observable when the determinant of the observability matrix 𝑃𝑜, is 
not zero. 
 
3.2 First-Order System Attack Scenario 
  
 In this section attack scenarios on a first order system are presented, the state and 
the output of the first order system will first be shown and the difference between the 
original and attacked systems will be presented as well.   
 
3.2.1 Model of First-Order System Attacked by Constant Signal  
 
Starting with a first-order system attacked by a constant actuator signal which is 
represented by ℎ𝑘. The dynamics of the first-order system are: 𝐴 = 0.9, 𝐵 =1, 𝐶= 1, 𝐷= 1, 
𝐹 = 1, 𝐺 = 1, 𝑉 = 0.01, 𝑊 = 0.05. By substituting these values into (2.1) and (2.2): 
 
𝑥𝑘+1 =  0.9𝑥𝑘 +  𝑢𝑘 + 𝑣𝑘 (3.3)  
 
𝑦𝑘 =  𝑥𝑘 +  𝑢𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘 (3.4) 
   
Checking the controlibility and observability for the system:   
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𝑃𝑐 =  [𝐵] = [1] 
 
𝑃𝑜 =  [𝐶] = [1] 
 
Since the determinants are not zero, the first-order system is both controllable and 
observable. To reduce response time, the eigenvalue needs to be placed close to the 
origin. In this work, the eigenvalue will be placed at 0.4. Using the appropriate control 
gain to place the pole, (3.3) becomes: 
 
𝑥𝑘+1 =  0.4𝑥𝑘 +  𝑣𝑘 (3.5) 
  
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the first-order system state and output value: 
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Figure 3.2: Original state value in time of first-order system 
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Figure 3.3: Original output value in time of first-order system 
 
The two figures above show that when the control system is not attacked the original 
state and output value fluctuate around zero with some noise as expected.  
 
For the control system compromised by a false signal, ℎ𝑘, (ℎ𝑘=2) is used to 
represent the false signal. When the actuator in the control system is compromised, 
control input, 𝑢𝑘, is replaced by false signal, ℎ𝑘. Once the control system is attacked, the 
state and output equations of the first-order system become: 
 
𝑥𝑘+1 =  𝐴𝑥𝑘 +  𝐵ℎ𝑘 +  𝐹𝑣𝑘 (3.6) 
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𝑦𝑘 =  𝐶𝑥𝑘 +  𝐷ℎ𝑘 +  𝐺𝑤𝑘 (3.7) 
 
Now the state is augmented with the false signal ℎ𝑘, yielding 
 
[
𝑥𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘
] = [
𝐴 𝐵
0 𝐼
] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
] + [
𝐹
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.8)  
 
𝑦𝑘 = [𝐶 𝐷] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
] + 𝐺𝑤𝑘 (3.9)  
  
Eq. 3.8 and (3.9) can also be written as  
 
𝓍𝑘+1 = 𝒜𝑋𝑘 + ℱ𝑣𝑘 (3.10) 
 
𝓎𝑘 = 𝒞𝑋𝑘 +  𝐺𝑤𝑘 (3.11) 
 
There is a “switch point” which refers to the time at which the control system is attacked. 
In this work, the switch point is set to 25. From this time, the system model of the 
attacked system is:  
 
[
𝑥𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘
] = [
0.9 1
0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
] + [
1
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.12) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [1 1] [
𝑥𝑘
ℎ𝑘
] + 𝑤𝑘 (3.13)  
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Checking the observability of the attack system where 𝒜 and 𝒞 are used: 
 
𝑃𝑜 =  [
𝒞
𝒞𝒜
] =  [
1 1
0.9 2
] 
 
det |𝑃𝑜| = 1.1 
 
Since the determinant of the observability matrix 𝑃𝑜 is not zero it is observable. Figures 
3.4 and 3.5 are the state and output of the system when the system is compromised. 
 
Figure 3.4: Compromised state value in time of first-order system in the constant 
signal attack scenario 
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Figure 3.5: Compromised output value in time of first-order system in the constant 
signal attack scenario 
 
These figures show that after attack, the state and output approach a constant value. The 
control system functions well before it reaches the switch point and the value of the state 
𝑥𝑘, is around 0. However, after the switch point, (3.10) is used to calculate the value of 
the state 𝑥𝑘.  
 
3.2.2 Model of First-Order System Attacked by Ramp Signal 
 
To study a first-order system being attacked by a ramp signal, a ramp signal needs 
to be introduced in state-space representation: 
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[
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] = [
1 1
0 1
] [
𝑑𝑘
𝑏𝑘
] (3.14) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [1 0] [
𝑑𝑘
𝑏𝑘
] (3.15) 
   
The starting value of the ramp signal is 𝑑0, and the ramp slope is 𝑏0. Figure 3.6 shows a 
ramp signal with starting value at (1 , 1) and with a slope equal to 1: 
 
Figure 3.6: Ramp signal in time with starting value at (1 ,1) and slope equals to 1 
 
When the attack signal is a ramp signal where the slope of the ramp equals 1, model of 
the system when attacked becomes: 
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[
𝑥𝑘+1
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] = [
𝐴 𝐵 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
𝑑𝑘
𝑏𝑘
] + [
𝐹
0
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.16) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [𝐶 1 0] [
𝑥𝑘
𝑑𝑘
𝑏𝑘
] + 𝐺𝑤𝑘 (3.17) 
 
Using the same system parameters as before where 𝐴 = 0.9, 𝐵 =1, 𝐶= 1, 𝐷= 1, 𝐹 =
1, 𝐺 = 1, 𝑉 = 0.01, 𝑊 = 0.05. The equations for the attacked systems become: 
 
[
𝑥𝑘+1
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] = [
0.9 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 1
] [
𝑥𝑘
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] + [
1
0
0
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.18) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [1 1 0] [
𝑥𝑘
𝑑𝑘
𝑏𝑘
] + 𝑤𝑘 (3.19) 
 
Checking the observability for the attack model: 
 
𝑃𝑜 =  [
𝒞
𝒞𝒜
𝒞𝒜2
] =  [
1 1 0
0.9 2 1
0.81 2.9 3
] 
 
det |𝑃𝑜| = 1.21 
 
The determinant of the observability matrix 𝑃𝑜 is not zero which means it is observable. 
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Figure 3.7 and 3.8 show the state and output for the first-order system when the 
actuator signal has been replaced by a ramp signal that starts at time index, 𝑘 =25. 
 
Figure 3.7: Compromised state value in time of first-order system in ramp signal 
attack scenario 
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Figure 3.8: Compromised output value in time of first-order system in ramp signal 
attack scenario 
 
As is shown in the figures, the state and output initially exhibit the behavior of an 
unharmed system which changes when the false actuator signal replaces the original 
actuator signal and approaches a ramp.  
 
Both constant signal and ramp signal attack scenarios show that the first-order 
control system functions well before it reaches the switch point in time. The state and 
output of the control system would either becomes a constant or a ramp signal. By 
replacing the value of control input, the attacker can achieve the goal that compromises 
the system in a way they want. More importantly, the value of the output sometimes can 
go very high which has a bad influence on the control system at most of the time. In the 
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next section, original and attacked second-order system models are developed and 
investigated. 
 
3.3 Second Order System attack scenario 
 
3.3.1 Model of Second Order System Attacked by Constant Signal 
 
Assuming the second-order system is 𝐴 = [
0 0.8
−0.8 −0.8
], 𝐵 = [
1
0
], 𝐶= [1 0],  𝐷= 
1, 𝐹 = [
1 0
0 1
],𝐺 = 1, 𝑉 =0.1, 𝑊 = 0.5. Since there are two states in the second-order 
system, two different process noises will be created as 𝑣𝑘1, and 𝑣𝑘2, for two states, but 
both noise covariances are still 0.1. The numerical form of the second-order system is: 
 
[
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
] = [
0 0.8
−0.8 −0.8
] [
𝑥(1)𝑘
𝑥(2)𝑘
] + [
1
0
] 𝑢𝑘 + [
1 0
0 1
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.20) 
   
𝑦𝑘 = [1 0] [
𝑥(1)𝑘
𝑥(2)𝑘
] + 𝑢𝑘 + 𝑤𝑘 (3.21) 
 
Checking the controllability and observability for the second-order system: 
 
𝑃𝑐 =  [𝐵  𝐴𝐵 ] = [
1 0
0 −0.8
] 
 
det |𝑃𝑐| = −0.8 
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𝑃𝑜 =  [
𝐶
𝐶𝐴
] =  [
1 0
0 0.8
] 
 
det |𝑃𝑜| = 0.8 
 
The determinants of matrices 𝑃𝑐, and 𝑃𝑜, are not zero so the control system it is 
controllable and observable. Placing the poles of this second-order system at [0.4 −0.4] 
to reduce response time, (3.20) becomes: 
 
[
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
] = [
0.8 0.6
−0.8 −0.8
] [
𝑥(1)𝑘
𝑥(2)𝑘
] + [
1 0
0 1
] 𝑣𝑘 (3.22) 
   
The states and the output of the system are showen in Fgures 3.9 and 3.10: 
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Figure 3.9: Original states value in time of second-order system in the constant 
signal attack scenario 
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Figure 3.10: Original output value in time of second-order system in the constant 
signal attack scenario 
 
Using ℎ𝑘 equals 8 and when the second order system is attacked by a constant signal, the 
attack model of the second-order system becomes: 
 
[
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘
] = [
𝑎11 𝑎11 𝑏11
𝑎21 𝑎22 𝑏21
0 0 1
] [
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘
] + [
𝑓11 𝑓12
𝑓21 𝑓22
0 0
] [
𝑣𝑘1
𝑣𝑘2
] (3.23) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [𝑐11 𝑐12 𝐷] [
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘
] + 𝐺𝑤𝑘 (3.24) 
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where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 are the elements of 𝐴, 𝑏𝑖𝑗 are the elements of 𝐵, 𝑐𝑖𝑗 are the elements of 𝐶 and 
𝑓𝑖𝑗 are the elements of 𝐹. Recall that we have a second-order as 𝐴 = [
0 0.8
−0.8 −0.8
], 𝐵 = 
[
1
0
], 𝐶= [1 0],  𝐷= 1, 𝐹 = [
1 0
0 1
],𝐺 = 1, 𝑉 =0.1, 𝑊 = 0.5 Substituting the system 
values into the equations above: 
  
[
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘
] = [
0 0.8 1
−0.8 −0.8 0
0 0 1
] [
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘
] + [
1 0
0 1
0 0
] [
𝑣𝑘1
𝑣𝑘2
] (3.25) 
 
 𝑦𝑘 = [1 0 1] [
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
ℎ𝑘
] + 𝑤𝑘  (3.26) 
 
Checking the observability for the attack model: 
 
𝑃𝑜 =  [
𝒞
𝒞𝒜
𝒞𝒜2
] =  [
1 0 1
0 0.8 2
−0.64 −0.64 2
] 
 
det |𝑃𝑜| = 3.392 
 
The determinant of the observability matrix 𝑃𝑜 is not zero so it is observable. Figure 3.11 
and 3.12 show what the states and output become when the system is compromised at 25: 
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Figure 3.11: Compromised states value in time of second-order system in the 
constant signal attack scenario 
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Figure 3.12: Compromised output value in time of second-order system in the 
constant signal attack scenario 
 
Obviously, the second-order system shows the same kind of result as the first order 
system attack model does, in other words, the states and output of the control system 
behave well before the switch point. However, after the system is corrupted, we clearly 
see the states and the output fluctuate around a final non-zero constant value. 
 
3.3.2 Model of Second Order System Attacked by Ramp Signal 
 
The attack model of second order system attacked by ramp signal is: 
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[
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] = [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
𝑏11 0
𝑏21 0
0        0
0        0
1 1
0 1
] [
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] + [
𝑓11 𝑓12
𝑓21
0
0
𝑓22
0
0
] [
𝑣𝑘1
𝑣𝑘2
] (3.27) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [𝑐11 𝑐21 1 0] [
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] + 𝐺𝑤𝑘 (3.28) 
   
where 𝑎𝑖𝑗, 𝑏𝑖𝑗, 𝑐𝑖𝑗 and 𝑓𝑖𝑗 are the same elements stated before. Recall that for a second-
order system 𝐴 = [
0 0.8
−0.8 −0.8
], 𝐵 = [
1
0
], 𝐶= [1 0],  𝐷= 0, 𝐹 = [
1 0
0 1
],𝐺 = 1, 𝑉 =0.1, 
𝑊 = 0.5. Thus: 
 
[
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] = [
0 0.8
−0.8 −0.8
1 0
0 0
0        0
0        0
1 1
0 1
] [
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] + [
1 0
0
0
0
1
0
0
] [
𝑣𝑘1
𝑣𝑘2
] (3.29) 
 
𝑦𝑘 = [1 0 1 0] [
𝑥(1)𝑘+1
𝑥(2)𝑘+1
𝑑𝑘+1
𝑏𝑘+1
] + 𝑤𝑘 (3.30)  
 
Checking the observability for the attack model: 
 
𝑃𝑜 =  [
𝒞
𝒞𝒜
𝒞𝒜2
𝒞𝒜3
] =  [
1 0
0 0.8
1 0
2 1
−0.64 −0.64
0.512 0
2 3
1.36 5
] 
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det |𝑃𝑜| = 14.38 
 
The determinant of the observability matrix 𝑃𝑜 is not zero so it is observable. The 
compromised states and output are shown in Figures 3.13 and 3.14: 
 
Figure 3.13: Compromised states value in time of second-order system in ramp 
signal attack scenario 
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Figure 3.14: Compromised output value in time of second-order system in ramp 
signal attack scenario 
 
Similar to the first-order system, after switch point, the states and output of the system 
continue as a ramp signal which once again satisfies our goal.  
 
 All four situations show that once the control system is corrupted by the false 
information, the states and output of the system would go as the attackers set up. In 
chapter 4, the states and output values cannot be obtained directly from the system will be 
discussed, a bank of Kalman filters is used to estimate the system and decide if the 
system is attacked or not by three main aspects. 
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4. Actuator Intrusion Detection Discussion 
 
 In this chapter the primary results of this work, the ability of a bank of Kalman 
filters to detect of the actuator intrusions of the control system, are presented by using the 
system dynamics and attack signals described in chapter three. First, how to design a 
bank of Kalman filters for detecting the false signals is presented in this work, then the 
detection of false signals using probability calculation is shown, the detection of false 
signals using innovation sequence and the detection of false signals using bank of 
Kalman filters estimation are discussed as well. By studying of the relationship between 
the process and measurement noise covariances, some suggestions are made for 
shortening the convergence times. There is an additional method to detect the false 
signal, called the sampled mean value method, it will be presented at the end of this 
chapter. 
 
4.1 Design of Bank of Kalman Filters 
 
 The figure below shows how a bank of Kalman filters is designed specifically for 
actuator intrusion in this work. The unknown parameter needs to be estimated is the false 
actuator signal, ?̂?1𝑘, and ?̂?2𝑘, are the corresponding state estimates at time index 𝑘, for 
each Kalman filter in the bank, ?̂?𝑘, is the combined state estimate at time index 𝑘. 
Probability 𝑝1𝑘, and 𝑝2𝑘, are the corresponding conditional probability estimates at time 
index 𝑘, for each state estimate. 
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Figure 4.1: Design of a bank of Kalman filters for actuator intrusion detection 
 
As seen in Figure 4.1, two Kalman filters are designed, one for each of the two systems, 
one of which is the original system and the other one is the control system with the false 
signal. After given control input (or false signal) and system output, the two Kalman 
filters will have two different state estimates. By using (2.17), the probability of each 
state estimate being treated as the true one by the bank is known and the combined state 
estimate is obtained by using ?̂?𝑘 = 𝑝1𝑘?̂?1𝑘 + 𝑝2𝑘?̂?2𝑘 . If the output comes from a system 
under attack, which results 𝑝2𝑘 > 𝑝1𝑘, when we have ?̂?𝑘 ≅ ?̂?2𝑘 and conversely.  
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4.2 Detection Discussion on Bank of Kalman Filters 
 
4.2.1 Detection of False Signals using Probability Calculation 
 
As was discussed in chapter 2 for calculating the probability of original and 
attacked system, both the conditional probability of the two Kalman filters in a bank 
should sum to one. The probability of the Kalman filter estimating the original system 
with true control input goes to one which means that the control system is not 
compromised by the false information. But after the false signal is injected, the 
probability of the Kalman filter estimating the attacked system would go to one and the 
probability of the other Kalman filter goes to zero. Figures 4.2 through 4.5 each show the 
detection of attack using probability detection. The blue line represents the control 
system without intruded by the false information and the red line means the original 
system is being attacked by the false signal. As expected, blue line first goes to 1 before 
time 25 but the red line quickly goes up to 1 after switch point, which tells the engineers 
that the control system is being attacked. 
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Figure 4.2: Posterior probabilities of the false signal intrusion hypotheses used in 
the bank of Kalman filters in which the first-order control system is attacked by the 
constant signal 
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Figure 4.3: Posterior probabilities of the false signal intrusion hypotheses used in 
the bank of Kalman filters in which the first-order control system is attacked by the 
ramp signal 
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Figure 4.4: Posterior probabilities of the false signal intrusion hypotheses used in 
the bank of Kalman filters in which the second-order control system is attacked by 
the constant signal 
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Figure 4.5: Posterior probabilities of the false signal intrusion hypotheses used in 
the bank of Kalman filters in which the second-order control system is attacked by 
the ramp signal 
 
There is always some delay at the switch point, especially in the situation the second-
order system attacked by ramp signal. It is interesting to find out if there are any 
relationships for the noise covariances and the convergence times. This topic is 
investigated in section 4.3. 
 
4.2.2 Detection of False Signals using Innovation Sequence 
 
Using the subtraction between the estimation value and the true value of the 
system output to decide whether the system is attacked by the false information is also an 
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excellent choice. This difference is used when calculating the innovation sequence in 
(2.19). The innovation sequence should be zero when the control system is not attacked 
since the estimation value of the output is close to the real value of the output. Once the 
control system is intruded by the false information, the true value of the control system 
will change instantly, and the innovation sequence is then no longer close to zero. Figures 
4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 show that the innovation sequence of the first and second order 
system attacked by constant and ramp signal at time index 25, we can see clearly how 
innovation sequence deviates from zero to another value after time index 25: 
 
Figure 4.6: Innovation sequence of the first-order system attacked by the constant 
signal 
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Figure 4.7: Innovation sequence of the first-order system attacked by the ramp 
signal 
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Figure 4.8: Innovation sequence of the second-order system attacked by the constant 
signal 
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Figure 4.9: Innovation sequence of the second-order system attacked by the ramp 
signal 
 
All the figures above show that before the switch point, the innovation sequence 
fluctuates at around 0 with some noise but changes to a constant signal away from 0 or a 
ramp signal after being intruded, demonstrating the control system is successfully 
intruded by the false signal.  
 
4.2.3 Detection of False Signals using Bank of Kalman Filters Estimation 
 
In addition to using the probability calculation and innovation sequence to detect 
the actuator intrusion, the combined state estimate ?̂? = 𝑝1?̂?1 + 𝑝2?̂?2 produced by bank of 
Kalman filters can be used for intrusion detections as well. The next two figures are the 
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estimated state value of the first-order system which is compromised by constant and 
ramp signals at time index 25: 
 
Figure 4.10: First-order system estimated state value when the system is attacked by 
constant signal at time 25 
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Figure 4.11: First-order system estimated state value when the system is attacked by 
ramp signal at time 25 
 
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 prove that by using the combined estimate state by bank of Kalman 
filters the false information detected when the false information is injected into the 
control system. Like presented before, the detection is successful since the estimation 
value after time index 25 is away from 0 and goes to the signal the attacker wants.  
 
Figure 4.12 presents estimated states for the second-order system when the 
second-order system is attacked by a constant signal at time 25, from the estimated value 
we know that the system is corrupted by the false signals because the two states of the 
system go up or down to a constant value and away from 0 after attacked. The 
compromised states in Figure 4.12 may not show the constant signals obviously enough, 
62 
 
 
 
however, when increasing the total iterations to a larger number we can see the attacked 
states eventually go up or down to a constant value which once again proves that bank of 
Kalman filters detect the intrusion successfully. 
 
Figure 4.12: Second-order system estimated states value when the system is attacked 
by constant signal at time 25 
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Figure 4.13: Second-order system estimated states value when the system is attacked 
by constant signal at time 25 with longer iterations 
 
Figure 4.14 presents the bank of Kalman filter estimation of second-order system being 
attacked by a ramp signal. The compromised states either go up or go down to a ramp 
signal provide an evidence that the bank of Kalman filter estimation also can be used to 
detect attacks. 
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Figure 4.14: Second-order system estimated states value when the system is attacked 
by the ramp signal at time 25 
 
 
4.3 Noise Effect on Bank of Kalman Filters 
 
This section will focus on how the process and measurement noise affect 
detection time. There are two convergence times, the first one measures how the bank of 
Kalman filters recognize the true system. The second convergence time is how long it 
takes the bank of Kalman filters to detect when the control system is corrupted by the 
false information. Both detections are significant, but the second one is the key to 
detecting false signals which is also the prime priority of this thesis work. The figure 
below explains what two convergence times are and how they are calculated. 
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 Figure 4.15: Explanation of convergence1 and convergence 2 
 
The figure above shows that how both convergence times are defined: setting up a 
threshold at 0.99, when the time blue line in the probability figure which stands for the 
true system exceeds the threshold, this time period is called convergence 1 and when the 
time red line which stands for the attacked system exceeds the threshold, it is then called 
convergence 2. 
 
4.3.1 Correlation Between Noise and Convergence Time 
 
 In order to find out the potential relationship between convergence time and the 
noise covariance, simulations between convergence times and the noise covariances are 
investigated.  
Conv1 
Conv2 
Probability 
Time Index k 
0.5 
1 
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 This thesis will use the first-order system which attacked by a constant signal 
discussed before for demonstrating the correlations and use several different noise 
covariance to do the simulations. Table 4.1 shows the covariance values chosen: 
 
Table 4.1: Noise covariance values chosen for convergence analysis for first order 
system attacked by the constant signal 
𝑉 W 
0.01 0.01 
0.02 0.02 
0.05 0.05 
0.1 0.1 
0.2 0.2 
0.5 0.5 
 
Selecting 𝑉, and 𝑊, for 6 values: 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2 and 0.5, thus there are 36 
combinations of simulations to discuss. By testing each one of the simulations 200 times, 
there is an average value for each case. The algorithm for probability calculation works 
well for each time of the simulation with the noise covariances. This proves that the 
algorithm is robust for detecting false information with a decent noise covariance.  
 
After running simulations, there are 36 data points of each convergence time. 
Figure 4.16 shows the result of simulations; this figure shows some simple relationship 
between the noise covariances and the convergence times. 
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Figure 4.16: Convergence time on the first-order system attacked by the constant signal 
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In this table, the x axis is the value of the noise covariances we choose, the y axis is the 
value for time, the blue dots are the values for convergence 1 and the red dots are the 
values for convergence 2. The blue line and the red line show that the trend of both 
convergence times in the sequence of both noise covariances from small to large values. 
For an example, when 𝑉 =0.05, and 𝑊=0.5, convergence 1 equals to 6.22, convergence 
2 equals to 6.315.  
 
From the tendency of the convergence time in the table, a simple conclusion is 
obvious: both the noise covariance  𝑉, and 𝑊, has a positive relation with the 
convergence time. But for validating this conclusion about the correlations between the 
noise covariances and the convergence times, the correlation plot between the noise 
covariances and the convergence times is needed. There are two correlation coefficients 
used in this work, the Pearson and the Spearman correlation coefficients. The Pearson 
correlation evaluates the linear relationship between two continuous variables and the 
Spearman correlation evaluates the monotonic relationship between two continuous or 
ordinal variables [29].  
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Figure 4.17: Correlation plot between noise covariance and convergence time for the 
first- order system attacked by constant signal using the Pearson correlation 
coefficient 
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Figure 4.18: Correlation plot between noise covariance and convergence time for the 
first- order system attacked by constant signal using the Spearman correlation 
coefficient 
 
 
Since the correlation plots are symmetric, only the cells on either the upper or 
lower part of the plot need to be considered. Each cell in the figures is the scatter plot of 
corresponding element on the x and y axis, the plot diagonal is the histogram of the 
element itself. The correlations between 𝑉, W and the convergence times are shown in the 
red circled parts of Figures 4.17 and 4.18. The red numbers in each cell are the 
correlation values of the elements the x, and y, axes; the larger the number is, the more 
correlated the elements are. Both plots suggest that the convergence times have a positive 
relationship with the noise covariance 𝑉, W. In addition, the convergence times are more 
related to process noise 𝑉 than measurement noise W in a positive way. This means the 
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intrusion detection will be affected more by the value of process noise than the value of 
measurement noise. Although the noise covariance of a control system generally cannot 
be changed while operating the system, this simulation result of the relationship tells the 
engineers if the Kalman filter is to distinguish the true system and detect the false system 
in as short in time as possible, a small noise covariance is helpful. 
 
In conclusion: both correlation plots show that the relationship between the noise 
covariances and the convergence times is a positive relation.  
 
4.4 Intrusion Detection by Using Sample Mean Values 
 
4.4.1 Intrusion Detection by Using Sample Mean Values with Known State 
 
Apart from the methods used above, there is one more method used for detecting 
the false information in the control system; that is comparing the state sample mean value 
for the original and attacked systems.  This work will continue to use a first-order system 
attacked by a constant signal as an example to illustrate this method. It is assumed that 
the state of the system is available, and by setting the initial sample mean value of the 
state to one, the difference between unharmed and harmed states is shown in the 
simulation. The models used are (2.1) and (3.2): 
 
𝑥𝑘+1 =  𝐴𝑥𝑘 +  𝐵𝑢𝑘 +  𝐹𝑣𝑘 (2.1) 
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𝑥𝑘+1 =  𝐴𝑥𝑘 +  𝐵ℎ𝑘 +  𝐹𝑣𝑘 (3.2) 
  
in which ℎ𝑘, is a constant signal that replaces the control input 𝑢𝑘 = −𝐾𝑐𝑥. The state 𝑥𝑘, 
is: 
 
?̅?𝑘 = (𝐴 +  𝐵𝐾𝑐)
𝑘?̅?0 (4.1) 
 
Eq (3.2), can also be written as: 
 
𝑥𝑘 =  𝐴
𝑘𝑥0 + ∑ 𝐴
𝑘−𝑖−1𝑘−1
𝑖=0  (𝐵ℎ + 𝑣𝑖) (4.2)  
  
Thus, the mean value of the attacked system state is 
 
?̅?𝑘 =  𝐴
𝑘?̅?0 + ∑ 𝐴
𝑘−𝑖−1
𝑘−1
𝑖=0
 𝐵ℎ (4.3) 
 
The summation in (4.3) can be simplified to (𝐴𝑘 − 𝐼)(𝐴 − 𝐼)−1, therefore (4.3) becomes: 
 
?̅?𝑘 =  𝐴
𝑘?̅?0 + (𝐴
𝑘 − 𝐼)(𝐴 − 𝐼)−1 𝐵ℎ (4.4) 
 
From (4.1) and (4.4), the mean value of the system state for both original and attacked 
systems are obtained. If the simulations of the two equations are different, it can prove 
that the sample mean value of the original and attacked system are not the same. It also 
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means the sample mean value of the system state will change once the system is attacked 
by a false signal. So this method is another that can be used for detecting whether the 
control system is attacked or not. 
 
Figure 4.19: System state mean value in time when the system is not attacked by the 
false signal 
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Figure 4.20: System state mean value in time when the system is attacked by the 
constant signal with known state 
 
In Figure 4.19, the state mean value for the original system goes to zero. On the other 
hand, the mean value of the state for the system attacked with a constant actuator signal 
converges on a finite non-zero value. 
 
Figure 4.21 is an example of the control system is being attack by a constant 
signal at time index k=15: 
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Figure 4.21: System state mean value in time when the system is attacked by the 
constant signal with known state at time index k=15 
 
Figure 4.21 shows similar result of what we investigate in chapter 4, the sample mean 
value of the state goes to zero before time index k=15 and after this point, it goes to a 
non-zero constant value. 
 
4.4.2 Intrusion Detection by Using Sample Mean Values with Unknown State 
 
 When the state of the system is unknown, a Kalman filter can be used to estimate 
the state, recall (2.6): 
 
?̂?𝑘+1 =  𝐴?̂?𝑘 +  𝐵𝑢𝑘 +  𝐾𝑘(𝑦𝑘 − [𝐶?̂?𝑘 +  𝐷𝑢𝑘]) (2.6) 
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With the help of (2.6), the estimated value of state of the control system is known and 
there will not be a large deviation when comparing the estimated state value to the 
sample mean value of the state. It can be seen from Figure 4.22 that the estimated state 
value is very close to the sample mean value of the state. However, once the estimated 
state value deviates too much from sample mean value of the state, it can be considered 
as hacked. By setting up a threshold for the deviation, when the deviation exceeds the 
threshold, the system is then under attack. The result for the system without knowledge of 
the state is very similar to what is found by using the combined state estimate in a bank of 
Kalman filters. 
 
Figure 4.22: System state mean value in time when the system is attacked by the 
constant signal with unknown state 
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Thus, checking the mean value of the state for the control system is also a good 
method for detecting whether the system is attacked or not with or without knowledge of 
the state. 
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5. Conclusion and Future work 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
 In this thesis, the use of a bank of Kalman filter to detect an attack on a control 
system by the injection of false actuator signals is investigated. To document this 
investigation, an overview of the effects of  “hacking” on control systems to motivate this 
work is presented. The design process for Kalman filter and a bank of Kalman filters is 
summarized in chapter 2. In chapter 3, the first and second order system models used in 
this work together with the constant and ramp false actuator signals are discussed. By 
simulating the systems, states and outputs for both the unharmed and attacked situations 
are obtained. In chapter 4, intrusion detection using the probability calculation, the 
innovation sequence, and the bank of Kalman filters estimation as well as sample mean 
method are presented. 
 
5.2 Conclusion  
 
 The algorithm for detecting the false information in the control system works as 
expected. First and second order system are studied and intruded with constant and ramp 
signals. The algorithm of using a bank of Kalman filters to detect the false information is 
very robust. 
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 In chapter 4, the positive relationship between the noise covariances and both 
convergence times are discussed and shown. The analysis shows that the convergence 
times are more related to process noise 𝑉, than measurement noise W, in a positive way. 
 Finally, another method for detecting the false information is shown as well. 
Checking the sample mean value of the system state for the system is most suitable for 
the situations that we can easily calculate the mean value of the system state, since in this 
way engineers do not need a bank of Kalman filter to detect the false signal. 
 
5.3 Future Work 
 
 First, a model could be applied to this detection technique of an actual physical or 
electrical system. Since this work only used a mathematical model for the state space 
equation, engineers can design a real-life state space model which is observable to test it 
and this detection method is only used for a first and second order system, it can be 
expanded actual physical systems. 
 
 Second, the false signal used in this thesis are the constant and ramp signal, 
control system engineers can test this detection algorithm with some other false 
information such as sin wave or exponential signal.  
 
 The relationship between the noise covariance and convergence time can be 
investigated further, the concepts of needed shorten the delay time of detecting the false 
signal can be informed by simulations. 
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Last but not least, the last method, which is comparing the sample mean value of 
the original and attacked state in the control system can be applied to a real-life system as 
well. When the state of the control system is known, this method would be more efficient 
compared to a bank of Kalman filter detection. 
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APPENDIX A: MATLAB CODES 
A1. MATLAB Code for Intrusion Detection by Using a Bank of Kalman Filter 
for First-order System Attacked by Constant Signal 
 
%Cleaning 
clear all  
close all   
clc; 
  
% count=0; 
% counter=200 ; 
% store=NaN(counter,2); 
% mean_store=NaN(1,2); 
% for j=1:counter 
  
%Set time index 
tstop=100; 
t=1:tstop; 
%Load the noise for the system 
load('Vk.mat') 
load('Wk.mat') 
%Define noise covariances 
V=0.01;W=0.05;  
  
%Original First-order System matrices 
A=0.9;B=1;C=1;D=1;F=1;G=1; 
%Define the size of state and output of the original system 
x=NaN(2,tstop); 
y=NaN(1,tstop); 
  
%Initialize state for the original system 
x(1,1)=1; 
%Define new pole for the original system 
pole=0.4; 
%Calculate control gain 
Kc=-place(A,B,pole);    
  
%Attacked First-order System matrices 
A2=[A,B;0 1];C2=[C 1];F2=[F;0]; 
%Define switch point 
SwitchPoint=25;  
%Define constant signal value 
h=2; 
%Initialize state before and on switch point for the attacked system 
x(2,1:SwitchPoint-1)=0; 
x(2,SwitchPoint)=h; 
  
%A bank of Kalman filter settings 
%Define the size of error covariance, Kalman gain and estimated state 
of the attacked system 
p=NaN(1,tstop); 
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Kk=NaN(1,tstop); 
xhat1=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize error covariance and estimated state for the original 
system 
p(1)=50; 
xhat1(1)=1; 
  
%Define the size of error covariance, Kalman gain and estimated state 
of the attacked system 
p2=NaN(2,2,tstop); 
Kk2=NaN(2,tstop); 
xhat2=NaN(2,tstop); 
%Initialize error covariance and estimated state for the attacked 
system 
p2(:,:,1)=50*eye(2); 
xhat2(:,1)=[1;0]; 
  
%Define the size of combined estimated state 
xhat=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Define the size of control input 
U=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize conbined estimated state 
xhat(1)=0.5*xhat1(1)+0.5*xhat2(1,1); 
%Initialize control input  
U(1)=Kc*xhat(1); 
%Initialize and define the size of conditional probability 
pThetaY1=[0.5 NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
pThetaY2=[0.5 NaN(1,length(t)-1)]; 
%Define the size of innovation sequence 
y_tilde(1:2,1:length(t)) = NaN; 
%Initialize innovation sequence 
y_tilde(:,1)=0; 
  
%A bank of Kalman filter simulation in time 
for k=1:tstop 
    if k<SwitchPoint 
        %Original system before switch point 
        x(1,k+1)=A*x(1,k)+B*U(k)+Vk(k); 
        y(k)=C*x(1,k)+D*U(k)+G*Wk(k); 
    else 
        %Attacked system after switch point 
        x(:,k+1)=A2*x(:,k)+F2*Vk(k); 
        y(k)=C2*x(:,k) +G*Wk(k); 
    end 
    %Error covariance update equation of the original system       
    p(k+1)=A*p(k)*A'-(A*p(k)*C'*C*p(k)*A')/(C*p(k)*C'+W)+F*V*F'; 
    %Kalman gain update equation of the original system       
    Kk(k)=(A*p(k)*C')/(C*p(k)*C'+G*W*G'); 
    %Estimated state update equation of the original system   
    xhat1(k+1)=A*xhat1(k)+B*U(k)+Kk(k)*(y(k)-C*xhat1(k)); 
%Error covariance update equation of the attacked system  
p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'-
(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/...                                        
   (C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+W)+F2*V*F2'; 
    %Kalman gain update equation of the attacked system  
    Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*W*G'); 
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    %Estimated state update equation of the attacked system  
    xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); 
    %Innovation squence update equation 
    y_tilde(:,k)=[y(k);y(k)]-[C*xhat1(k);C2*xhat2(:,k)]; 
    %Innovation covariance of the original system 
    y_covar_tilde1=C*p(k)*C'+G*W*G'; 
    %Innovation covariance of the attacked system 
    y_covar_tilde2=C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*W*G';  
    %Liklihood function of the original system 
    pYTheta1=(2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(y_covar_tilde1))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde(1,k)'*eye/y_covar_tilde1*y_tilde(1,k)); 
    %Liklihood function of the attacked system 
    pYTheta2=(2*pi)^(-2/2)*sqrt(1/det(y_covar_tilde2))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde(2,k)'*eye/y_covar_tilde2*y_tilde(2,k)); 
    %Calculate condination probability 
    den=pYTheta1*pThetaY1(k)+pYTheta2*pThetaY2(k); 
    pThetaY1(k+1)=pYTheta1*pThetaY1(k)/den; 
    pThetaY2(k+1)=pYTheta2*pThetaY2(k)/den; 
    %Combined estimated state 
    xhat(k+1)=pThetaY1(k)*xhat1(k)+pThetaY2(k)*xhat2(1,k);  
    %Feedback control for calculating control input 
    U(k+1)=Kc*xhat(k+1); 
end 
  
%Plot combined Estimated state 
plot(t,xhat(1:end-1)); 
ylabel('Estimated state xhat') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Plot innovation sequence  
figure 
plot(t,y_tilde(1,:)) 
ylabel('y tilde for constant input') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Plot conditional probability 
figure 
plot(t,pThetaY1(1:end-1),'b',t,pThetaY2(1:end-1),'r') 
legend('first order system with true control input','first order system 
with constant input') 
ylabel('Conditional probability') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Set a threshold 
thresh = 0.99; 
%Define convergence time one and two 
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaY1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaY2 > 
thresh,1);]; 
%Display convergence time one and two 
disp('Convergence time:') 
t(convergenceIndex) 
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A2. MATLAB Code for Intrusion Detection by Using a Bank of Kalman Filter 
for First-order System Attacked by Ramp Signal 
 
%Cleaning 
clear all  
close all   
clc; 
  
%Set time index 
tstop=100; 
t=1:tstop; 
%Load the noise for the system 
load('Vk.mat') 
load('Wk.mat') 
%Define noise covariances 
V=0.01;W=0.05;  
  
%Original first-order System matrices 
A=0.9;B=1;C=1;D=1;F=1;G=1; 
%Define the size of state and output of the original system 
x=NaN(3,tstop); 
y=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize state for the original system 
x(1,1)=1; 
%Define new pole for the original system 
pole=0.4; 
%Calculate control gain 
Kc=-place(A,B,pole);   
  
%Attacked first-order System matrices 
hA=[1,1;0 1]; 
A2=[A, B, zeros(1,1); 
    zeros(2,1),hA]; 
C2=[C,1,0];F2=[F;0;0]; 
%Define switch point 
SwitchPoint=25;  
%Initialize state before and on switch point for the attacked system 
x(2:end,1:SwitchPoint-1)=0; 
x(2:end,SwitchPoint)=[1;0.02]; 
  
%A bank of Kalman filter settings 
%Define the size of error covariance, Kalman gain and estimated state 
of the attacked system 
p=NaN(1,tstop); 
Kk=NaN(1,tstop); 
xhat1 = NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize error covariance and estimated state for the original 
system 
p(1)=50; 
xhat1(1)=1; 
  
%Define the size of error covariance, Kalman gain and estimated state 
of the attacked system 
p2=NaN(3,3,tstop); 
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Kk2=NaN(3,tstop); 
xhat2= NaN(3,tstop); 
%Initialize error covariance and estimated state for the attacked 
system 
p2(:,:,1)=50*eye(3); 
xhat2(:,1)=[1;0;0]; 
  
%Define the size of combined estimated state 
xhat=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Define the size of control input 
U=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize conbined estimated state 
xhat(1)= 0.5 * xhat1(1) + 0.5 * xhat2(1,1); 
%Initialize control input 
U(1)=Kc*xhat(1); 
%Initialize and define the size of conditional probability 
pThetaY1=[0.5 NaN(1,length(t)-1)];  
pThetaY2=[0.5 NaN(1,length(t)-1)];  
%Define the size of innovation sequence 
y_tilde(1:2,1:length(t))=NaN; 
%Initialize innovation sequence 
y_tilde(:,1)=0; 
  
%A bank of Kalman filter simulation in time 
for k=1:tstop 
    if k<SwitchPoint 
        %Original system before switch point 
        x(1,k+1)=A*x(1,k)+B*U(k)+Vk(k); 
        y(k)=C*x(1,k)+D*U(k)+G*Wk(k); 
    else 
        %Attacked system after switch point 
        x(:,k+1)=A2*x(:,k) + F2*Vk(k);       
        y(k)=C2*x(:,k) + G*Wk(k); 
         
    end 
    %Error covariance update equation of the original system  
    p(k+1)=A*p(k)*A'-(A*p(k)*C'*C*p(k)*A')/(C*p(k)*C'+W)+F*V*F'; 
    %Kalman gain update equation of the original system   
    Kk(k)=(A*p(k)*C')/(C*p(k)*C'+G*W*G'); 
    %Estimated state update equation of the original system  
    xhat1(k+1)=A*xhat1(k)+B*U(k)+Kk(k)*(y(k)-C*xhat1(k)); 
    %Error covariance update equation of the attacked system 
p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/... 
    (C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+W)+F2*V*F2'; 
    %Kalman gain update equation of the attacked system 
    Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*W*G'); 
    %Estimated state update equation of the attacked system  
    xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); 
    %Innovation squence update equation 
    y_tilde(:,k)=[y(k);y(k)]-[C*xhat1(k);C2*xhat2(:,k)]; 
    %Innovation covariance of the original system 
    y_covar_tilde1=C*p(k)*C'+G*W*G'; 
    %Innovation covariance of the attacked system 
    y_covar_tilde2=C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*W*G'; 
    %Liklihood function of the original system 
    pYTheta1=(2*pi)^(-1/2)*sqrt(1/det(y_covar_tilde1))... 
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        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde(1,k)'*eye/y_covar_tilde1*y_tilde(1,k)); 
    %Liklihood function of the attacked system 
    pYTheta2=(2*pi)^(-3/2)*sqrt(1/det(y_covar_tilde2))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde(2,k)'*eye/y_covar_tilde2*y_tilde(2,k)); 
    %Calculate condination probability 
    den=pYTheta1*pThetaY1(k)+pYTheta2*pThetaY2(k); 
    pThetaY1(k+1)=pYTheta1*pThetaY1(k)/den; 
    pThetaY2(k+1)=pYTheta2*pThetaY2(k)/den; 
    %Combined estimated state 
    xhat(k+1)=pThetaY1(k)*xhat1(k)+pThetaY2(k)*xhat2(1,k);  
    %Feedback control for calculating control input 
    U(k+1)=Kc*xhat(k+1); 
end 
  
%Plot combined Estimated state 
plot(t,xhat(1:end-1)); 
ylabel('Estimated state xhat') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Plot innovation sequence  
figure 
plot(t,y_tilde(1,:)) 
ylabel('y tilde for ramp input') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Plot conditional probability 
figure 
plot(t,pThetaY1(1:end-1),'b',t,pThetaY2(1:end-1),'r') 
legend('first order system with true control input','first order system 
with ramp input') 
ylabel('Conditional probability') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Set a threshold 
thresh = 0.99; 
%Define convergence time one and two 
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaY1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaY2 > 
thresh,1);]; 
%Display convergence time one and two 
disp('Convergence time:') 
t(convergenceIndex) 
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A3. MATLAB Code for Intrusion Detection by Using a Bank of Kalman Filter 
for Second-order System Attacked by Constant Signal 
 
%Cleaning 
clear all 
close all 
clc; 
  
%Set time index 
tstop=100; 
t=1:tstop; 
%Load the noise for the system 
load('Vk1.mat') 
load('Vk2.mat') 
load('Wk.mat') 
%Define noise covariances 
V=0.1;W=0.5;  
  
%Original second-order System matrices 
A=[0,0.8;-0.8,-0.8];B=[1;0];C=[1,0];D=1;F=eye(2);G=1; 
%Define the size of state and output of the original system 
x=NaN(3,tstop); 
y=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize state for the original system 
x(1:2,1)=[1,1]; 
%Define new pole for the original system 
pole=[0.4,-0.4]; 
%Calculate control gain 
Kc=-place(A,B,pole); 
  
%Attacked second-order System matrices 
A2=[A, B;0,0,1];C2=[C,1];F2=[F;zeros(1,2)]; 
%Define switch point 
SwitchPoint=25; 
%Define constant signal value 
h=8; 
%Initialize state before and on switch point for the attacked system 
x(3,1:SwitchPoint-1)=0; 
x(3,SwitchPoint)=h; 
  
%A bank of Kalman filter settings 
%Define the size of estimated state, error covariance and Kalman gain 
of the original system 
xhat1 = NaN(2,tstop); 
p=NaN(2,2,tstop); 
Kk=NaN(2,tstop); 
%Initialize error covariance and estimated state for the original 
system 
p(:,:,1)=eye(2)*50; 
xhat1(:,1)=[1;1]; 
  
%Define the size of error covariance, Kalman gain and estimated state 
of the attacked system 
p2=NaN(3,3,tstop); 
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Kk2=NaN(3,tstop); 
xhat2= NaN(3,tstop); 
%Initialize error covariance and estimated state for the attacked 
system 
p2(:,:,1)=50*eye(3); 
xhat2(:,1)=[1;1;0]; 
  
%Define the size of combined estimated state 
xhat=NaN(2,tstop); 
%Define the size of control input 
U=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize conbined estimated state 
xhat(:,1)=0.5*xhat1(:,1)+0.5*xhat2(1:2,1); 
%Initialize control input  
U(1)=Kc*xhat(:,1); 
%Initialize and define the size of conditional probability 
pThetaY1 = [0.5 NaN(1,length(t)-1)];  
pThetaY2 = [0.5 NaN(1,length(t)-1)];  
%Define the size of innovation sequence 
y_tilde(1:2,1:length(t)) = NaN; 
%Initialize innovation sequence 
y_tilde(:,1)=0; 
  
%A bank of Kalman filter simulation in time 
for k=1:tstop 
    if k<SwitchPoint 
        %Original system before switch point 
        x(1:2,k+1)=A*x(1:2,k)+B*U(k)+F*[Vk1(:,k);Vk2(:,k)]; 
        y(k)=C*x(1:2,k)+D*U(k)+G*Wk(k); 
    else 
        %Attacked system after switch point 
        x(:,k+1)=A2*x(:,k)+F2*[Vk1(:,k);Vk2(:,k)]; 
        y(k)=C2*x(:,k)+G*Wk(k); 
    end 
    %Error covariance update equation of the original system  
p(:,:,k+1)=A*p(:,:,k)*A'-(A*p(:,:,k)*C'*C*p(:,:,k)*A')/... 
    (C*p(:,:,k)*C'+W)+F*[V,0;0,V]*F'; 
    %Kalman gain update equation of the original system   
    Kk(:,k)=(A*p(:,:,k)*C')/(C*p(:,:,k)*C'+G*W*G'); 
    %Estimated state update equation of the original system   
    xhat1(:,k+1)=A*xhat1(:,k)+B*U(k)+Kk(:,k)*(y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k)); 
    %Error covariance update equation of the attacked system 
p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/... 
    (C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+W)+F2*[V,0;0,V]*F2'; 
    %Kalman gain update equation of the attacked system  
    Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*W*G'); 
    %Estimated state update equation of the attacked system  
    xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)-C2*xhat2(:,k)); 
    %Innovation squence update equation 
    y_tilde(:,k)= [y(k);y(k)]-[C*xhat1(:,k);C2*xhat2(:,k)];  
    %Innovation covariance of the original system 
    y_covar_tilde1=C*p(:,:,k)*C'+G*W*G'; 
    %Innovation covariance of the attacked system 
    y_covar_tilde2=C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*W*G'; 
    %Liklihood function of the original system 
    pYTheta1= (2*pi)^(-2/2)*sqrt(1/det(y_covar_tilde1))... 
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        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde(1,k)'*eye/y_covar_tilde1*y_tilde(1,k)); 
    %Liklihood function of the attacked system 
    pYTheta2= (2*pi)^(-3/2)*sqrt(1/det(y_covar_tilde2))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde(2,k)'*eye/y_covar_tilde2*y_tilde(2,k)); 
    %Calculate condination probability 
    den = pYTheta1*pThetaY1(k) + pYTheta2*pThetaY2(k); 
    pThetaY1(k+1) = pYTheta1*pThetaY1(k)/den; 
    pThetaY2(k+1) = pYTheta2*pThetaY2(k)/den; 
    %Combined estimated state 
    xhat(:,k+1) = pThetaY1(k)*xhat1(:,k)+pThetaY2(k)*xhat2(1:2,k); 
    %Feedback control for calculating control input 
    U(k+1)=Kc*xhat(:,k+1); 
     
end 
  
%Plot combined Estimated state 
plot(t,xhat(:,1:end-1)); 
ylabel('Estimated state xhat') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
legend('Estimated state 1 ','Estimated state 2','location','best') 
%Plot innovation sequence  
figure 
plot(t,y_tilde(1,:)) 
ylabel('y tilde for constant input') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Plot conditional probability 
figure 
plot(t,pThetaY1(1:end-1),'b',t,pThetaY2(1:end-1),'r') 
legend('second order system with true control input','second order 
system with constant input') 
ylabel('Conditional probability') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Set a threshold 
thresh = 0.99; 
%Define convergence time one and two 
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaY1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaY2 > 
thresh,1);]; 
%Display convergence time one and two 
disp('Convergence time:') 
t(convergenceIndex) 
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A4. MATLAB Code for Intrusion Detection by Using a Bank of Kalman Filter 
for Second-order System Attacked by Ramp Signal 
 
%Cleaning 
clear all 
close all 
clc; 
  
%Set time index 
tstop=100; 
t=1:tstop; 
%Load the noise for the system 
load('Vk1.mat'); 
load('Vk2.mat'); 
load('Wk.mat'); 
%Define noise covariances 
V=0.1;W=0.5; 
  
%Original second-order System matrices 
A=[0,0.8;-0.8,-0.8];B=[1;0];C=[1,0];D=1;F=eye(2);G=1; 
%Define the size of state and output of the original system 
x=NaN(4,tstop); 
y=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize state for the original system 
x(1:2,1)=[1,1]; 
%Define new pole for the original system 
pole=[0.4,-0.4]; 
%Calculate control gain 
Kc=-place(A,B,pole); 
  
%Attacked second-order System matrices 
hA=[1,1;0 1]; 
A2=[A, B, zeros(2,1); 
    zeros(2,2),hA]; 
C2=[C,1,0];F2=[F;zeros(2)]; 
%Define switch point 
SwitchPoint=25; 
%Initialize state before and on switch point for the attacked system 
x(3:end,1:SwitchPoint-1)=0; 
x(3:end,SwitchPoint)=[1;0.2]; 
  
%A bank of Kalman filter settings 
%Define the size of error covariance, Kalman gain and estimated state 
of the attacked system 
p=NaN(2,2,tstop); 
Kk=NaN(2,tstop); 
xhat1 = NaN(2,tstop); 
p(:,:,1)=eye(2)*50; 
xhat1(:,1)=[1;1]; 
  
%Define the size of error covariance, Kalman gain and estimated state 
of the attacked system 
p2=NaN(4,4,tstop); 
Kk2=NaN(4,tstop); 
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xhat2= NaN(4,tstop); 
%Initialize error covariance and estimated state for the attacked 
system 
p2(:,:,1)=50*eye(4); 
xhat2(:,1)=[1;1;0;0]; 
  
%Define the size of combined estimated state 
xhat=NaN(2,tstop); 
%Define the size of control input 
U=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize conbined estimated state 
xhat(:,1)=0.5*xhat1(:,1)+0.5*xhat2(1:2,1); 
%Initialize control input 
U(1)=Kc*xhat(:,1); 
%Initialize and define the size of conditional probability 
pThetaY1=[0.5 NaN(1,length(t)-1)];  
pThetaY2=[0.5 NaN(1,length(t)-1)];  
%Define the size of innovation sequence 
y_tilde(1:2,1:length(t))=NaN; 
%Initialize innovation sequence 
y_tilde(:,1)=0; 
  
%A bank of Kalman filter simulation in time 
for k=1:tstop 
    if k<SwitchPoint 
        %Original system before switch point 
        x(1:2,k+1)=A*x(1:2,k)+B*U(k)+F*[Vk1(:,k);Vk2(:,k)]; 
        y(k)=C*x(1:2,k)+D*U(k)+G*Wk(k); 
    else 
        %Attacked system after switch point 
        x(:,k+1)=A2*x(:,k) + F2*[Vk1(:,k);Vk2(:,k)]; 
        y(k)=C2*x(:,k) + G*Wk(k); 
    end 
    %Error covariance update equation of the original system  
p(:,:,k+1)=A*p(:,:,k)*A'-(A*p(:,:,k)*C'*C*p(:,:,k)*A')/... 
    (C*p(:,:,k)*C'+W)+F*[V,0;0,V]*F'; 
    %Kalman gain update equation of the original system  
    Kk(:,k)=(A*p(:,:,k)*C')/(C*p(:,:,k)*C'+G*W*G'); 
    %Estimated state update equation of the original system  
    xhat1(:,k+1)=A*xhat1(:,k)+B*U(k)+Kk(:,k)*(y(k)-C*xhat1(:,k)); 
    %Error covariance update equation of the attacked system 
p2(:,:,k+1)=A2*p2(:,:,k)*A2'(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'*C2*p2(:,:,k)*A2')/... 
    (C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+W)+F2*[V,0;0,V]*F2'; 
    %Kalman gain update equation of the attacked system 
    Kk2(:,k)=(A2*p2(:,:,k)*C2')/(C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*W*G'); 
    %Estimated state update equation of the attacked system 
    xhat2(:,k+1)=A2*xhat2(:,k)+zeros(4,1)+Kk2(:,k)*(y(k)- ... 
  C2*xhat2(:,k)); 
    %Innovation squence update equation 
    y_tilde(:,k)= [y(k);y(k)]-[C*xhat1(:,k);C2*xhat2(:,k)]; 
    %Innovation covariance of the original system 
    y_covar_tilde1=C*p(:,:,k)*C'+G*W*G'; 
    %Innovation covariance of the attacked system 
    y_covar_tilde2=C2*p2(:,:,k)*C2'+G*W*G'; 
    %Liklihood function of the original system 
    pYTheta1= (2*pi)^(-2/2)*sqrt(1/det(y_covar_tilde1))... 
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        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde(1,k)'*eye/y_covar_tilde1*y_tilde(1,k)); 
    %Liklihood function of the attacked system 
    pYTheta2= (2*pi)^(-4/2)*sqrt(1/det(y_covar_tilde2))... 
        *exp(-0.5*y_tilde(2,k)'*eye/y_covar_tilde2*y_tilde(2,k)); 
    %Calculate condination probability 
    den = pYTheta1*pThetaY1(k) + pYTheta2*pThetaY2(k); 
    pThetaY1(k+1) = pYTheta1*pThetaY1(k)/den; 
    pThetaY2(k+1) = pYTheta2*pThetaY2(k)/den; 
    %Combined estimated state 
    xhat(:,k+1) = pThetaY1(k)*xhat1(:,k)+pThetaY2(k)*xhat2(1:2,k); 
    %Feedback control for calculating control input 
    U(k+1)=Kc*xhat(:,k+1); 
end 
  
%Estimated states 
plot(t,xhat(:,1:end-1)); 
ylabel('Estimated state xhat') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
legend('Estimated state 1 ','Estimated state 2','location','best') 
%Plot innovation sequence  
figure 
plot(t,y_tilde(1,:)) 
ylabel('y tilde for ramp input') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Plot conditional probability 
figure 
plot(t,pThetaY1(1:end-1),'b',t,pThetaY2(1:end-1),'r') 
legend('second order system with true control input','second order 
system with ramp signal') 
ylabel('Conditional probability') 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
%Set a threshold 
thresh = 0.99; 
%Define convergence time one and two 
convergenceIndex = [find(pThetaY1 > thresh,1);find(pThetaY2 > 
thresh,1);]; 
%Display convergence time one and two 
disp('Convergence time:') 
t(convergenceIndex) 
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A5. MATLAB Code for Intrusion Detection by Using Sample Mean Method 
 
%Cleaning 
clear all 
close all 
clc; 
  
%Set time index 
tstop=100; 
t=1:tstop; 
%Load the noise for the system 
load('Vk.mat') 
load('Wk.mat') 
%Define noise covariances 
V=0.01;W=0.05;  
  
%Original First-order System matrices 
h=2;A=0.9;B=1;C=1;D=1;F=1;G=1; 
%Define the size of sample mean value of state  
x_mean=NaN(1,tstop); 
%Initialize sample mean value of state 
x_mean(1)=1; 
%Define switch point 
switchpoint=15; 
%Define new pole for the original system 
pole=0.4; 
%Calculate control gain 
Kc=-place(A,B,pole);    
  
%Sample mean value of state simulation in time 
for k=1:tstop 
    if k<switchpoint; 
        %Original system before switch point 
        x_mean(k+1)=(A+B*Kc)^k*x_mean(1); 
    else 
        %Attacked system before switch point 
        x_mean(k)=(A^k)*x_mean(1)+((A^k)-1)*((A-1)^-1)*B*h; 
    end 
end 
  
%Plot sample mean value of the state 
figure 
plot(t,x_mean) 
xlabel('Time Index k') 
ylabel('Sample Mean Value of State') 
 
